

than Microsoft's \$67.7 Billion and IBM's \$65.1 Billion. Apple's brand value exceeded the combined brand value of Microsoft's and IBM's individual brand values. Legendary Coca-Cola's iconic brand value slipped to #3rd rank with \$78.4 Billion in estimated brand value.

By closely collaborating with his chief designer Joni Ives, Steve Jobs turned the product innovation process at Apple on its head. Prior to his return, the engineers and manufacturers at Apple decided the functionality and the technical components needed to engineering design a product. There was limited consultations with their designers. Or the marketers came in with what they claimed 'their' customers must have. The designers were called in at the very end – primarily to skin the pre-determined components with a decorative veneer. Jobs turned the whole product innovation process on its head. Designers, with empathy for their users' experiences, prototyped and decided what a product or service should look and feel like. Then the engineers were told to pack in the functional components, and marketers were told to wait for the millions of delighted loyal customers come knocking on their doors – as they actually did sometimes waiting all night in lines under rain or holiday snow.

Reviving design sensibility

In 1985, CEO Steve Jobs was mostly edged out by the board of the company he co-founded and raised since April 1976 with Steve Wozniak and Mike Markkula (Isaacson, 2011). Under CEO John Sculley who was brought in from Pepsi by Jobs to make Apple more retail savvy, Apple struggled for a over a decade.

From 1993 to 1996, Apple switched CEOs three times, from John Sculley to Michael Spindler, and Gil Amelio. In 1995 Microsoft launched its very popular Windows 95, and a year later Apple's sales for Macintosh desk top computers crashed precipitously.

In 1997, Jobs partnered with his arch-rival Bill Gates at Microsoft and received an infusion of \$150 million that Apple badly needed (Isaacson, 2011). Microsoft was able to launch Microsoft Office for Macintosh – a blockbuster for both.

Jobs completely re-innovated Apple's desktop computer between 1998 and 2001, and launched it with a radical new design as iMac. It came in bright unprecedented colors such as purple, green, and blue. This revived the Apple brand significantly. To promote the corporate brand further, in May 2001 Apple announced the opening of Apple's iStores to directly educate and interface with their consumers. It cost money, the sales stayed low in \$5 Billion range, and the net income hit rock bottom hovering below \$100 Million. With all these shortages, Jobs kept funding R&D by more than \$400 Million. (See Table-2). In October 2001, Apple innovated iPod digital audio player, which was seamlessly integrated with iMac, and legally downloadable iTunes - all visible and available to play in iStores. Jobs, thus took complete control of Apple's corporate brand, from end-to-end. All these rollouts cost money and took time to get the results in earnings. But gradually sales started running upwards.

Table-2: Apple's Financials for selected turnaround years

YEAR (\$Mil.)	NET SALES	COST OF SALES	GROSS MARGIN	R&D	NET INCOME
1996	9,833	8,865	968	604	- 816
1997	7,081	5,713	1,368	485	- 1,045
1998	5,941	4,462	1,479	303	+ 309
1999	6,134	4,438	1,696	314	+ 601
2000	7,983	5,817	2,166	380	+ 786
2001	5,363	4,128	1,235	430	- 25
2002	5,742	4,139	1,603	446	+ 65
2003	6,207	4,499	1,708	471	+ 69
2004	8,279	6,020	2,259	489	+ 276
2005	13,931	9,888	4,043	534	+ 1,335
2006	19,315	13,717	5,598	712	+ 1,989
2008	32,479	21,334	11,145	1,109	+ 4,834
2009	36,537	23,397	13,140	1,133	+ 5,704
2010	65,225	39,541	25,684	1,782	+14,013
2011	108,249	64,431	43,818	2,429	+25,922
2012	156,508	87,846	68,662	3,381	+41,733
2013	171,910	106,606	64,304	4,475	+37,037

In 2004, as the financials perked up at Apple, so did its innovativeness and corporate brand value. In 2005, corporate brand value of Apple recovered by double digits to \$8.0 billion, and it ranked as #41 on the Top 100 Most Valuable Global Brands (See Table-1).

With financial success and growing net income, under Steve Jobs Apple become even more innovative. He innovated products with dramatic technological capabilities such as iPod Video and iPod Touch, which delighted his customers. And, then in 2007 he radically disrupted the phone market with the launch of innovative rule-breaking and elegantly designed mobile iPhone. Between 2007 and 2013, Apple kept upgrading iPod and iPhone product lines. Apple's corporate brand value rose with its innovation capabilities.

Case study 3: Corporate brand value of Samsung

Since 2000, Japanese enterprises have been steadily losing their brand values of their coveted brands relative to their global rivals not only from the US, but also from South Korea. In global electronics industry, in 2000 Samsung's brand value of \$5.2 Billion was less than 1/3rd of Sony's brand value \$16.4 Billion.

In just 15 years in 2015, Samsung's \$45.3 billion brand value had increased to approx. 7 times Sony's highly eroded \$7.7 Billion brand value, and more than 7 times Panasonic's \$6.4 Billion (See Table-1). In fact, Samsung's brand value was almost twice as much as the total brand value of Japan's top 3 brands Canon, Sony, and Panasonic combined.

How did Samsung boost its corporate brand value so sky high, ahead of other consumer electronics makers?

Charismatic leadership and design-driven transformation

Until 1995, Samsung Electronics of South Korea manufactured imitative, inexpensive electronic parts and components for other original-equipment manufacturers (OEMs). They were made to make things according to the specifications and target costs mandated to them. The company's strategic leaders valued efficiency, scale, reliability, and speed – with low-cost leadership (Gehani, 2013).

In 1996, Samsung Group Chairman Lee Kun-Hee became quite visibly frustrated with Samsung's defective products and lack of innovation. He made a big public display of how frustrated he was by gathering thousands of defective phones produced by Samsung in the lobby of the corporate office. And then he ran a bulldozer over it (Khanna, Song & Lee, 2011). He often smashed phones against the walls to check how rugged they were built. His recommendation to senior Samsung executives: test the phones by throwing them against the wall (Gehani, 2013).

Chairman Lee supported the new design training programs with his personal attention and a high priority. Nobody could derail them even during the 1997 financial economic downturn. The newly trained designers developed a holistic view. The designers used the same tools as the ones they used for innovation: *empathy, visualization, and experimentation*. They combined these to rapidly develop Samsung's dynamic technological capabilities.

Outside-in & inside-out open talent development

Lee was acutely aware of need for world-class talent. To promote open innovation, he instituted a two-pronged global talent development program (Khanna et al., 2011). This involved sending Samsung managers with good mental capabilities to go abroad for 18-24 months. They learned the local languages, made contacts with some important local people, and completed an important value-adding innovation project. This was not unlike what Lee's predecessors had done by going to Japan to earn engineering degrees at some of the major Japanese universities like Tokyo Institute of Technology and Kyoto University.

The second prong of Lee's talent development program was Samsung recruiters going to the West and hiring the best Korean and non-Korean MBAs, engineers, and PhDs from leading companies and consulting firms in US and Europe (Khanna et al., 2011). They were then appointed in key positions. To facilitate their smooth entry in the Korean organizations, they were given extensive orientation and mentoring by senior Korean strategic leaders.

When Samsung Electronics branched out on its own from the conglomerate, it was in head-to-head in mortal combat with global electronics giants like Apple and Sony. In 2014Q3, Samsung's profit fell 60% year-to-year. In 2015Q1 it recovered a little, but it was still below the year before. In the face of world-wide popularity of iPhone, only Samsung survived. The phone divisions of former rivals such as Motorola, Nokia, Blackberry, and Ericsson are almost gone. Partly this is because since 2006, Samsung has retained its leadership in global TV market with its blockbuster brands like One Design, Curved Smart, Bordeaux and Touch of Color. Smartphone sales have also contributed to record earnings for Samsung (See Table-3).

Table-3: Samsung's Financials for selected turnaround years

YEAR (\$Mil)	NET SALES	COST OF SALES	GROSS MARGIN	R&D	NET INCOME
2009	117,821	81,756	36,065	6,384	8,436
2010	137,905	91,562	46,343	8,115	14,400
2011	142,403	96,785	45,618	8,613	11,853
2012	188,351	118,621	69,730	n.a.	22,333
2013	217,462	130,934	86,528	n.a.	28,978

So: Mergent Database.

Innovating Galaxy Note

Samsung has been constantly looking out for innovative entrepreneurial opportunities. After introducing Galaxy S smartphone and Galaxy Tab tablet, Samsung designers noted a market gap (Yoo & Kim, 2015). Many Japanese and Korean workers have been traditionally carrying a small pocket diary to take notes during their meetings. Neither the 4" screen phone, nor 9" screen tablet provided a good substitute for this pocket diary. Samsung realize that this would need a new technology platform. Samsung designers quickly developed a design concept for a smart diary with 5.5" screen and a pen interface. When this design concept was pitched to Samsung's senior managers, they questioned the new screen size. The conventional thinking by their marketing department was that screens for mobile pocket phones can not be larger than 5". The critics objected that the phone users will not put such a big thing next to their face. It will make their face look smaller.

The new phone platform required changing users' attitude towards mobile phones. Samsung designers created a mock-up that looked like a diary for test marketing. It had a smart cover that did not make it look that big. The innovative new 'phalbet' category made Galaxy Note series very successful and profitable. Samsung uses its smart cover strategy for other products, such as smaller Galaxy S.

Case study 4: Corporate brand value of Toyota

In the global automobile industry, brand values of Toyota (and Honda) continue to dominate far ahead of the global brand values of the rest of automakers. Toyota's brand value of \$49.1 Billion in 2015 is more than double the brand value of Honda's brand value of \$23.0 Billion, and more than four times the brand value of Ford with longer heritage at \$11.6 Billion. Just over a decade earlier, at the dawn of the 21st century in 2000, the \$36.4 Billion brand value of Ford was almost twice as much as Toyota's \$18.8 Billion brand value. Toyota achieved this by ramping up its production process innovation much faster than Ford's and others.'

Open innovation in collaboration with strategic suppliers

Toyota's brand became one of the world's most valuable brands with its production process innovation, often known as lean production system. One of the key components of Toyota's innovation strategy is its collaborative open innovation with its suppliers (Iyer, Seshadri, & Vasher, 2009). Compared to its American rivals, such as General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler, Toyota (as well as Honda) use a close-knit and integrated collaboration with its suppliers.

Womack, Jones and Roos (1990) in their best-selling book *The Machine That Changed the World*, shared how Toyota's production process innovation disrupted the global auto industry in general, and the U.S. automakers in particular. Clark and Fujimoto (1991) identified the different stage operations and decision-making gates in the innovative lean product development process of Toyota. These observations have been validated by many other researchers (Gehani, 1992; Ulrich & Eppinger, 2008).

There is generally a much higher level of mutual trust between Toyota and its suppliers (Iyer, Seshadri, & Vasher, 2009). Many American auto corporations tend to swing between adversarial and collaborative open relationships with their suppliers. On the other hand, at Toyota there is much less contract-related paperwork and transactional cost than at Ford or GM. For example, Toyota has only a 16 page project requirement document with its major suppliers, whereas Toyota's North American rivals use 3.5 times longer 56 page project requirement document (Pereira, Ro and Liker, 2014: 547).

Toyota also uses a single-point of contact (a cross-trained engineer) for all communications with a supplier regarding a project's requirements. At rival American corporations, the project requirements are controlled by multiple persons in the purchasing department with different disciplinary backgrounds (Pereira, Ro and Liker, 2014). Toyota, invests much more in training and development of the competence of their engineers, but spends much less time coordinating with suppliers than do rival American auto makers.

Enterprise culture

Leaders at Toyota have often claimed that the most important secret to the success of their lean process innovation strategy is their culture (Takeuchi, Osono & Shimizu, 2008). It codifies certain problem-solving practices that are etched deep into the hearts and souls of their people

Schein (1984) noted that culture within an organization is like a three-layered wedding cake. What we see at the surface are the culture's artifacts. These artifacts are built on a layer of stated values, and the shared beliefs make the bottom layer. Whereas U.S. automakers have spent decades trying to imitate or replicate some aspects of Toyota's enterprise culture, they have barely scratched some surface artifacts of Toyota's culture (Pereira, Ro and Liker, 2014). There is still a chasm of differences in values and beliefs. Some key differences are as follows:

1. *Employee Engagement.* More designers and engineers are actively engaged in Toyota than their counterparts in rival U.S. auto enterprises. Through life-long employment, job-rotation, and job-enrichment, Toyota continually builds the capabilities and competencies of its work-forces deep down into the trenches of production and operations.
2. *Visual Communication.* Toyota uses more visual communication and illustrations than the rival U.S. automakers. There is frequent face-to-face and digital technology mediated communication. The communication intensity increases when key decisions need to be made. On the other hand, the communication

intensity at U.S. automakers increases when there is crisis – which happens quite frequently. The *Kanban* just-in-time production system encourages widespread sharing and visual display of key information (Gehani, 2001).

3. *Reduction of Variability Risks:* Toyota reduces its variability risk by using clearly articulated specifications and by production of products with consistent quality. The U.S. rivals add to their risk when they use unclear specifications and frequently change their suppliers on case-by-case or minimum cost-basis.

4. *Fact-based Decision Making.* Most Japanese enterprises, including Toyota, use collective decision-making (*nemawashi*) to reduce their risk of making wrong decisions (Gehani, 2001). At Toyota most of the design decisions are based on concrete objective facts rather than subjective judgments by individual supervisors – particularly managers far removed from the *gemba* work-site. Whenever there are disagreements, Japanese employees at all levels are mandated to go back to the basic facts. In many U.S. enterprises, design decisions are often made somewhat arbitrarily by the people higher up in the hierarchy because of their more authoritative power. For example, on one hand, an executive may fire a few designers in the guise of cutting cost and improving the bottom line. But at the same time, or soon thereafter, additional supporting administrators may be hired at many times more salaries (because they worked with the executive during their former employment).

Discussion

Lessons for corporate brand value from dynamic innovative capabilities

What lessons can be learned from the evolutionary grounded theory accounts of these multiple case studies. From the foregoing observations from four of the most valuable global corporate brands, it is quite clear that to sustain their brand values, enterprises must cultivate their unique value-adding resources, and build their dynamic innovative capabilities to improve their competitive advantage (Gehani, 1998). We explicate these briefly below to show how the rules of competition have changed.

1. Build dynamic capabilities

The dynamics of competition, value capture, and value creation is now changing fast in most industries (Ryall, 2013). Some resources and capabilities are ordinary and commonplace – which every other rival corporation can quickly access too. Enterprises use these resources to run their hierarchical or entrepreneurial organizations. Their staff must be recruited, paid wages, trained, organized, and motivated to contribute at their fullest potential. Government regulations must be complied. The workplace must be safe and free of hazards. Suppliers must be selected, certified, and coordinated. Sales deals must be closed. Banks and other lenders must be paid back on time – or else they can shut the enterprise down according to the contract terms signed. These ordinary resources and capabilities are necessary to run any enterprise – but these are not sufficient to win the market race. They do not help gain sustainable competitive advantage.

To beat the competition in the market space, on a sustained basis, especially in turbulent and complex global markets, such as for electronic appliances and automobiles, enterprises must develop their unique, idiosyncratic value-adding, and hard to imitate resources and capabilities. This is known as the resource-based view of competitive strategy (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991).

And then in fast clock-speed evolving industries and global markets, such as the information technology industry or the smartphone industry, the strategic leaders must accept that the intensity of rivalry as well as the market entry rules of the competitive games may altogether change periodically every few years (Ryall, 2013, Christensen, 1997). This requires new strategies for innovation.

2. Need for ongoing open innovations

Even for the well-established corporate brands, such as Coca-Cola, Kodak, or General Motors, heritage is not enough. They must keep innovating as Coca-Cola is doing, and Kodak and GM did not. The strategic leaders at Eastman Kodak in the 1990s thought that they would be able to continue to leverage their 100-year old iconic brand and continue to earn fat profit margins – forever (Gamble and Gehani, 2013). At first the resolution and quality of ‘disruptive’ digital images was inferior, and it did not pose a significant threat to Kodak’s high quality photographic films (Gehani, 1993). But Kodak’s digital rivals kept getting more innovative, and Kodak stood still. Kodak’s loyal customers left and the new generation of Millennial consumers did not see any sizzle in the Kodak brand. In January 2012 Kodak was forced to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection (Gamble and Gehani, 2012). After taking care of bankruptcy protection requirements, Kodak must innovate hard, like Apple and Samsung, to recover its lost market ground. Only with innovation, Kodak can re-rise like a phoenix and recover back its legendary reputation and brand value.

3. Appreciative culture

As we saw in the case of Toyota’s culture, strategic leaders can not overlook the creative and innovative power of their people’s imagination and trust. Leading brand owners like Google and Microsoft tap that regularly. The challenge is how to unleash this sub-merged intellect and vitality after the top and middle managements have been ill-treating their operations staff with mistrust and abuse of rampant layoffs. Every time Kodak’s leadership felt that the Kodak’s stock was slipping too low, they laid off a few more thousand employees to please the short-term expectations of their Wall Street shareholders (Gamble and Gehani, 2012). This sometimes temporarily increased their gross profitability (sales per employee), but very often Kodak paid the price with their employees’ falling morale and long-term productivity. Many U.S. companies tend to do this under pressure from their aggressive short-term shareholders. Leaders must reverse years of such autocratic abuses. Only then employees will wholeheartedly follow their leaders and contribute their imagination and innovativeness. As noted before, the underlying beliefs and ingrained attitudes drive the employees’ behavior and the corporation’s culture.

The personality of an organization’s culture also drives the corporate brand value (Aaker, 2004: 8). Credible leaders such as Tim Cook

at Apple, Bill Gates at Microsoft, and Charles Bronson at Virgin Atlantic, can sway their thousands of followers distributed around the world into action. Such leaders use their own deeds as well as words to inspire others. Other leaders must earn such employee and customer following.

4. Perceived innovative

Almost all enterprises and their strategic leaders, including owners of falling brands such as General Motors, Chrysler, or Sharp, prefer to believe that they are innovative – and believe that they are perceived as innovative by their employees and customers. Whereas some employees may be forced to believe this for short periods of time, some of the employees and most of the savvy customers can make a quick comparison with their rivals’ offerings. With Internet and social media, it has become easy to see through the veneer of purchased promotional haze. Unfortunately, many top management leaders, surround themselves with their supporters, and start believing their own hype. It is not hard for tire users around the world to compare tires offered by global brand rivals Goodyear, Bridgestone, and Michelin. Same is the case with smart phones, tablet computers, and automobiles. Every brand owner can spend money to buy media time, and claim great things. A key factor that many knowledgeable customers look for is whether a brand actually delivers on its brand promises.

Perceived quality and perceived innovation, sometimes, may be harder to achieve than delivering actual quality and actual innovation (Aaker, 2004: 8). Every small cue counts in building up the perception, trust, and reputation behind a brand.

4. Design thinking and user empathy

Finally, as we noted earlier, empathy with users’ experiences, resonance with their emotions, and honoring customers’ sensory perceptions are the new killer apps that design-driven innovative corporate brand leaders, like Apple, Google, and Samsung and others, frequently use. To facilitate this, Samsung’s design teams hired artists, writers, and ethnographers. Coca-Cola has been doing this successfully for 130 years. Steve Jobs did this intuitively rather than through market research. If Toyota did this more, there would be less recalls.

Design thinking also promotes frequent risk-taking and prototyping. When Steve Jobs returned to Apple in September 1997, Apple was within weeks of filing for bankruptcy. He shut down many incremental improvements, and focused on a few bold and breakthrough innovations such as iPod, iTunes, and iPhone. This paid off enormous returns in profitability and brand value, for many years come. More Japanese brand owners like Sony, Sharp, Toshiba, and Nissan could emulate such bold risk-taking. It is now possible to innovate on the run.

Conclusion

In conclusion, most practicing managers around the world must recognize that corporate brand value is one of the most important strategic asset that they must manage. This paper, therefore, set out

with a big challenge to re-examine the age-old tradition of building corporate brand values based on corporate identity, legacy, and stakeholder interactions. We did this by using a more appropriate research method of grounded theory approach coupled with case studies, and quantitative and qualitative data. Our evolutionary studies indicated that in the 21st Century, the corporate brand values are more closely correlated with the firms' dynamic innovative capability rather than their legacy or identity. We noted this in the case of the fall of the iconic brands of Eastman Kodak and General Motors, and we saw this in the phenomenal rise of corporate brand values of Apple and upstart Samsung. Legendary Coca-Cola keeps up its brand value with close connectivity with their customers and other shareholders such as women and environmentalists. Toyota does this through its reliable products coupled with an enigmatic and paradoxical corporate culture.

Future research studies, could explore these seminal findings for larger number of brands, and cull out the moderating influences of size of the firm, industry type, age or legacy, product features etc.. Another interesting line of inquiry will be to research the effect of cross-cultural and national differences. Corporate brand value has now become so critical that no managers and researchers can ignore it. Hopefully, this study paved the way for many more researchers to follow and more managers to practice.

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