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Ius et Praxis

On-line version ISSN 0718-0012

Abstract

BUSTAMANTE RUA, Mónica  and  PALOMO VELEZ, Diego. The presumption of innocence as rule of judgment and the standard of proof of the reasonable doubt in the criminal procedure. A reading from Colombia and Chile. Ius et Praxis [online]. 2018, vol.24, n.3, pp.651-692. ISSN 0718-0012.  http://dx.doi.org/10.4067/S0718-00122018000300651.

This paper intends to show the relationship of the standard of proof in the criminal process to issue a condemnatory sentence with the presumption of innocence as a probative and trial rule. From recognizing the legal transplant of a standard of evidence of the common law system, applied by juries that have no duty of motivation, the thesis is posed as the need to move towards a greater objectivity of the proof standard in a continental system, which is directly related to the necessary motivation of the judicial decision, especially from the trial assessment trial that allows reaching that degree of knowledge to condemn (beyond a reasonable doubt) and, consequently, distort the presumption of innocence (as a rule of judgement).

Keywords : Presumption of innocence; reasonable doubt; motivation of judgments.

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