Abstract

SANHUEZA RODRIGUEZ, Sebastián. First Person and Body Ownership. Logos [online]. 2019, vol.29, n.2, pp.230-237. ISSN 0716-7520.  http://dx.doi.org/10.15443/rl2919.

Bodily and mental self-ascriptions are forms of first-person thought where a subject attributes physical properties and psychological states to herself. The body-ownership view argues that a necessary and sufficient condition on such self-ascriptions is the existence of causal links between a spatio-temporal body and the self-ascribed properties or states. However, since P.F. Strawson’s influential attack, this view has been dismissed as a bad philosophical idea. The goal of this brief piece is to outline the body-ownership view and neutralise two classic lines of objection against it: on the one hand, that the stance is incoherent; and, on the other, that it has counterintuitive implications.

Keywords : first-person thought; body-ownership; causal links; P.F. Strawson; Animalism.

        · abstract in Spanish     · text in English     · English ( pdf )