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Cuadernos de economía

On-line version ISSN 0717-6821

Cuad. econ. vol.47 no.136 Santiago Nov. 2010 

Cuadernos de Economía, Vol. 47 (Noviembre), pp. 191-215, 2010



Equivalencia de Ingresos en un Duopolio Eléctrico*


Estrella Alonso1, Juan Tejada1

1 Universidad Pontificia Comillas, España
2 Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España

This article calculates the Bayes-Nash equilibria of a parametric family of auction models, which includes, among others, the classic models. In an analysis of two power generation firms with the same production capacity and risk neutrality, the models in this class verify a revenue equivalence result.

JEL: C72, D44.

Keywords: Subastas, Equilibio Bayesiano de Nash, Mercado Eléctrico.

En este artículo se calculan los equilibrios Bayesianos de Nash de una familia parametrica de modelos de subasta que contiene, entre otros, a los modelos de subasta clásicos. Al considerar dos empresas generadoras eléctricas con la misma capacidad de producción y neutrales al riesgo, los modelos de subasta pertenecientes a dicha familia verifican un resultado de equivalencia de ingresos.


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